

From Text to Political Positions on Foreign Aid:
Analysis of Aid Mentions in Party Manifestos from 1960 to 2012

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Abstract:

Are there systematic differences among political parties within countries over their positions on foreign aid allocation and delivery? Are Left parties more supportive of foreign aid than Right parties; and are they more supportive of multilateral aid? Are parties of the Right more likely to advocate the outsourcing of bilateral foreign aid to non-state development actors than their Left counterparts; and are they more efficiency-oriented in the delivery of foreign aid? Using new data on positions on foreign aid from party manifestos from four donor countries (United States, United Kingdom, Germany, Sweden) we examine how their parties compete over foreign aid policy. Further, we investigate how globalization and public sector reforms within donor countries have influenced foreign aid policy preferences of parties. We find some evidence that a Left-right divide exists on foreign aid policy though the results are strongest in the US and UK.

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Introduction and Literature

Foreign aid is justified as a response to development needs in poor countries, but its level and modality depend on political and economic conditions in donor countries. What is more, research has long recognized that aid serves as an instrument of state-craft used to advance developmental and non-developmental goals.² However, donor governments differ significantly in how much aid they give to poor countries and how they deliver bilateral assistance.³ Some donors prefer to give directly to a recipient government while others “bypass” the government, giving aid to non-state actors operating in the recipient country.⁴ Further variation exists in the extent to which donors choose to fund multilateral organizations through core contributions.⁵

To explain these differences in aid policy, a growing number of scholars have begun to examine variation in political institutions across donor countries as well as the role of ideology within donor countries over time.⁶ For instance, a study on U.S. aid allocation shows that Republicans are more likely to advocate for the instrumental use of aid than Democrats: under

² E.g. Baldwin 1985, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2009.

³ OECD CRS Statistics 2015.

⁴ Dietrich 2016; See Eichenauer and Reinsberg 2016 for a study that identifies variation in donor governments’ use of multilateral trust funds.

⁵ Milner 2006.

⁶ E.g. Noel and Therien Fleck and Kilby 2006, Milner and Tingley 2010, Tingley 2010; Dreher, Minasyan, Nunnenkamp 2013, Dietrich 2016, Heinrich Kobayashi, Bryant 2016.

See e.g. Dietrich 2016, , Dreher, Minasyan, Nunnenkamp 2013, Tingley 2010, Milner 2006, Fleck and Kilby 2006.

Republican leadership the share of aid promoting non-developmental purposes increases.⁷ Brech and Potrafke show that, on average, left-wing governments tend to prefer grants-based aid over other aid, though this relationship does not hold uniformly across donor countries.⁸ Other research has shown that, on average, left-leaning political parties, when in government, increase foreign aid spending, while Right parties advocate foreign aid cuts.⁹ However, this relationship appears to be not uniform across OECD countries. For instance, the election of right-leaning parties in the United Kingdom (2009), Sweden (2005), and the United States (2000) led to increases in foreign aid spending during conservative government tenure¹⁰ increases that, *prima facie*, would be at odds with expectations derived from the literature. Moreover, a recent systematic study on the allocation of German aid shows that under SPD leadership, the level of aid commitment decreases, *ceteris paribus*.¹¹ The conventional claim, therefore, that right-wing governments are less altruistic than left-wing donor governments has not been answered conclusively.

The above-mentioned studies all investigate the relationship between ideology and foreign aid by looking at actual outcomes in terms of foreign aid spending. While this outcome is a solid measure for capturing what parties actually do when they are in power, the studies may be limited in the extent to which they can help answer more complex theories of donor decision-making. As we argue in greater detail below, it may be that right-leaning parties are not as opposed to foreign aid as conventional wisdom would make us believe. Rather, they may be supportive while imposing certain conditions that influence the type and delivery of foreign aid. For instance, parties of the Right may advocate for more aid but only if principles of

⁷ Fleck and Kilby 2006.

⁸ Brech and Potrafke 2013.

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ OECD 2015

¹¹ Dreher, Nunnenkamp, Schmaljohann 2013.

performance management are applied in the delivery process; or, relatedly, if foreign aid is directed at individuals rather than the state. This hypothesis cannot be tested with the current state of the data on foreign aid allocation as conventional data sets do not code foreign aid along these dimensions. To understand what the politics of foreign aid are about, it is therefore important to look beyond available commitment data to other sources that reveal what political parties are advocating in foreign aid.

In this paper, we explore what political parties are arguing in debates on foreign aid. We want to know whether political parties differ systematically on their positions on foreign aid policy, as proposed by many previous research studies. To do this, we turn to political party platforms across donor countries as our data source, from which we extract specific party positions on multiple dimensions of foreign aid decision-making. Though, as acknowledged above, proclaimed positions do not measure outcomes in terms of aid allocation and delivery agents, several scholars have demonstrated that party platforms are solid predictors of party behavior in office.¹² We believe that political party platforms reveal preferences about what parties would like to do with foreign aid when elected to office, and they do so on important dimensions of foreign aid policy that are not captured by other data.

Critics might argue that domestic policy, rather than foreign policy, or, for that matter, foreign aid policy, may be the least salient dimension in the political battle for votes. This suggested lack of salience, in turn, may lead to parties to underspecify their positions on foreign aid policy, and foreign policy issues, more broadly. However, attentive observers will acknowledge that party rhetoric about the importance of foreign aid and its future use can be hotly contested across parties around election day, especially during times of economic

¹² E.g. Budge and Hofferbert, 1990; Klingemann, Hofferbert, and Budge, 1994.

hardship.^{13, 14} What is more, a quick glance at original party manifestos across donor countries reveals that foreign aid policy is a consistent policy theme, exhibiting interesting temporal, cross-donor, and cross-party variation in terms of space devoted to foreign aid, expressed support for aid and/or corresponding delivery preferences.

To date the Comparative Manifesto project, the most common source for manifesto data across OECD countries, does not code party positions on foreign aid along the conventional left-Right spectrum. While our project plans to code party positions on foreign aid across all OECD donor countries and across time, this study presents originally collected data for the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany and Sweden from 1960 to 2013.

[see Figure 1]

Figure 1 illustrates the extent to which parties write about foreign aid in their manifestos. As Panel 1 shows, the manifesto space devoted to foreign aid does not change much over time, ranging between one and four percent on average. Panel 2 shows that the proportion of aid-related text out of manifesto passages devoted to international issues ranges between 27 and 40 percent. In Figure 2 we plot the same measures by political party ideology using the conventional one-dimensional left-right spectrum. Accounting for different types of ideology, we see that there is not much difference between the types of parties. Instead, parties appear to closely track one another on aid. During periods when manifestos comprise a smaller percentage of aid-related text in Left party manifestos, it also comprises a smaller proportion of aid-related text in center

¹³ Brech and Potrafke 2013, Heinrich, Kobayashi, Bryant 2016.

¹⁴ What is more, a recent study of the Japanese party system dynamics, Proksch, Slapin, and Thies (2010) shows that the salience of foreign policy as an issue area in the electoral contest has been consistently high.

and Right manifestos. The exception is that for most of the 1980s through the mid-2000s, center parties devoted a much larger percentage of their international section to aid.

[see Figure 2]

Using an overall left-right ideological distinction between parties, we then systematically predict aid policy preferences across a number of important aid dimensions: i.e. we seek to identify ideological differences between Left and Right parties in (1) their overall support of foreign aid, (2) the utility they assign to aid (development versus non-developmental goals), (3) preferences for aid types (bilateral versus multilateral) and aid delivery mechanisms (government-to-government aid versus outsourcing), and (4) demands for policy adjustment in aid-receiving countries. We approach our investigations of the link between ideology and foreign aid in political text by testing existing hypotheses in the literature. We also develop our own argument about how ideology influences the delivery process of foreign aid.

We find that on some but not all foreign aid dimensions differences exist among political parties in how they position themselves in electoral competitions within their countries on foreign aid policy. Conservative governments are significantly more likely to stress the need for effective aid in their manifestos and are significantly less likely to support multilateral aid. We also find that systematic differences among parties are not necessarily consistent across donor countries. For instance, we find that, in the United States, the Right is more likely to take a more

negative view towards foreign aid than the Left. In the US and UK, conservative parties are less likely to mention growth as a goal of aid.

In the remainder of the article we present our argument and derive testable hypotheses. We then describe our approach to collecting and coding positions on foreign aid from political party platforms over time, from 1964 to 2012. Finally, we present and discuss our preliminary results.

Argument

The analysis of party manifesto content has been shown to be a valid measure of political party partisan composition and public opinion captured as a standardized point on a single left-right continuum.¹⁵ As such, political party manifestos articulate policy pledges that parties want to accomplish once in power. What generates a party's position on foreign aid policy? We assume, though do not test, that parties represent their constituents' interests on foreign aid. We also assume that parties use positions on foreign aid to distinguish themselves from one another as they engage in a political battle to win electoral office.¹⁶

We argue that citizen preferences for foreign aid have their origin in differing views about the appropriate role of the state in the provision of goods and services.¹⁷ We think of foreign aid, though sent abroad, as akin to domestic assistance in the form of goods and services. Conservatives consider markets as the solution to problems of government, suggesting that greater use of market-mechanisms, from contracting to public private partnerships, will improve

¹⁵ Huber and Gabel (2000: p. 102).

¹⁶ Rhetoric around election-day suggests that foreign aid policy can be hotly contested among parties. During economic crises, in particular, evidence suggests that the support for foreign aid declines among the general public (Heinrich, Kobayashi, and Bryant 2016) making foreign aid a more salient policy issue. Relative to domestic policy issues, however, foreign policy issues such as foreign aid, membership in international organizations and national defense receive less attention if measured as text devoted to the policy area.

¹⁷ Dietrich 2016

efficiency, quality, and responsiveness of these goods and services.¹⁸ The Left's position on goods and service delivery is more pro-state, both in terms of state size and scope in the delivery process. This distinction in core preferences about the size and scope of the state not only shapes policy proposals in the domestic sphere. Rather, references about the appropriate role of the state in goods and service provision inform both domestic *and* foreign policy, and directly shape party preferences on foreign aid allocation and delivery mechanisms.

At its core, foreign aid is a governmental transfer of taxpayer funds that redistributes wealth from the donor to the aid-receiving country. Because we expect conservatives, on average, to be more opposed to government involvement in foreign aid,¹⁹ we predict differences in the extent to which political parties engage with foreign aid in a positive, supportive fashion. Left parties should stress the positive benefits of government aid for constituents and especially recipient populations. For example, in 2010, the Labour Party in the UK announced: "Developing countries need help to adapt, reduce deforestation and emissions. From 2013 we will provide climate assistance additional to our commitment to provide 0.7 per cent of national income in overseas aid. No more than ten per cent of our aid will be counted towards climate finance."

As mentioned above, it might not be that conservative governments oppose foreign aid as such, but they might be more critical of it, especially for aid given to recipient governments. The Conservative Party in the UK also said in 2010 that they would abide by the commitment to spend 0.7% on aid but were more critical of the commitment: "We will honour our commitment to spend 0.7 per cent of national income in aid, and ensure our aid is transparent and properly targeted. We will spend at least £500 million a year to tackle malaria. Both the British people

¹⁸ Osborne and Gaebler 1992, Savas 2000, Lundsgaard 2002

¹⁹ See also Tingley 2010.

and those who receive aid will get more control over how it is spent.” This discussion generates two testable hypotheses regarding a party’s position on foreign aid policy:

*Hypothesis 1a: Left parties are **more** likely to positively engage with foreign aid than parties of the Right.*

*Hypothesis 1b: Left parties are **less** likely to negatively engage with foreign aid than parties of the Right.*

If, as is commonly done, one associates parties of the Right with demands for more market orientation in the delivery of goods and services,²⁰ then one should expect a conservative government to push for more performance-oriented aid delivery tactics. Relatedly, the pro-markets stance would lead to greater levels of outsourcing to non-state development actors in the implementation of foreign aid. Anecdotal evidence lends support for this initial contention. Recent victories of conservative parties in market-oriented political economies, including Canada (2006), Sweden (2007), and the United Kingdom (2010) have led to reforms in the delivery of domestic goods and services as well as foreign aid. These reforms emphasize efficiency criteria.

The British Right makes this case in the party’s green paper in 2009: “We are absolutely clear that, as taxpayers feel the pinch, maintaining public support for our aid programme will require a much greater focus on performance, results and outcomes. Our bargain with taxpayers is this: in return for your contribution of hard-earned money it is our duty to spend every penny of aid effectively ... We bring a natural scepticism about government schemes. In many developing countries, supporting the state means supporting a particular group or tribe. Labour

²⁰ Cites

sometimes gives aid directly to governments without adequate scrutiny.”²¹ Similarly, the U.S. Republican party has stressed in recent manifestos that private aid and charitable donations work better than government aid: “Americans are the most generous people in the world. Apart from the taxpayer dollars our government donates abroad, our foundations, educational institutions, faith based groups, and committed men and women of charity devote billions of dollars and volunteer hours every year to help the poor and needy around the world. This effort, along with commercial investment from the private sector, dwarfs the results from official development assistance, most of which is based on an outdated, statist, government to government model, the proven breeding ground for corruption and mismanagement by foreign kleptocrats. Limiting foreign aid spending helps keep taxes lower, which frees more resources in the private and charitable sectors, whose giving tends to be more effective and efficient.”

The promotion of greater efficiency in aid delivery goes hand in hand with efforts to measure results of foreign aid at the individual, rather than at the country level. The focus on individual-level outcomes is consistent with the Right’s ideological emphasis on individual Rights and freedoms. Given the challenges of measuring the impact of aid at the country-level, the Right’s performance-oriented approach to aid delivery also contributes to the “individualization” of foreign aid, as this approach of measuring impact prioritizes short-term individual outcomes for bench-marking over more long-term country level measures.²² This discussion yields three related testable propositions:

*Hypothesis 2a: Right parties are **more** likely to outsource the delivery of foreign aid to non-state development actors.*

²¹ Cited from Dietrich 2016 (p. 101)

²² Author interview with a Swedish government official, Stockholm, June 2013.

*Hypothesis 2b: Right parties are **more** likely to include the term “effective” in their aid-related sections in their manifestos than parties of the Left.*

*Hypothesis 2c: Right parties are **more** likely to directly target/mention individuals as recipients of their aid than parties of the Left.*

Finally, political parties do not only differ on the role of the state in the provision of goods and services in developing countries, they also differ on (1) the kinds of goals that aid should advance abroad as well as (2) the extent to which the pursuit of these goals would be accomplished through multilateral foreign aid. We expect, for instance, that a party’s position on the right-left ideological spectrum influences whether or not the aid should be used to promote development abroad or for non-developmental goals such as international security and democratization. Consistent with research by Fleck and Kilby in the context of U.S. foreign aid giving,²³ we expect that right-leaning parties are more likely to promote the use of foreign aid abroad for non-developmental purposes and the Left to be more oriented towards promoting growth and development in the recipient country. Consistent with Milner,²⁴ we expect that parties of the Left will be more likely to favorably view the core-funding of multilateral organizations than Right parties.

As anecdotal evidence for both of these claims, the Democrats in 2000 announced: “We should use our influence in multilateral development institutions to not only provide emergency assistance for stabilizing economies and to create social safety nets, including unemployment

²³ Fleck and Kilby 2006.

²⁴ Milner 2006.

insurance and health care, but also to give people the skills, education, and training they need to compete in the New Economy.” Conservative parties will be more concerned about potentially controlling how multilateral aid is spent. For example, in 1984 the Republican manifesto read: “We strongly support President Reagan's decision not to increase funding for the International Development Association because of its predilection for nations with state-dominated economic systems.” This discussion generates the final set of testable hypotheses:

*Hypothesis 3a: Left parties are **more** likely to refer to recipient growth as a goal in their aid-related manifesto sections than Right parties.*

*Hypothesis 3b: Right parties are **more** likely to refer to non-developmental goals in their aid-related manifesto sections than Left parties.*

*Hypothesis 3c: Left parties are **more** likely to have a favorable view towards multilateral foreign aid.*

Data

Thus far, little knowledge exists about how political parties engage in political battles over foreign aid policy.²⁵ The most common data for political party text comes from the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) data project. Historically, the CMP has focused on domestic issues, though EU and trade policy have also been systematically (though coarsely) coded.²⁶

To test our hypothesis we collected new data on party's foreign aid positions over time across four donor countries.²⁷ The donor countries currently include the United States, the United

²⁵ With the exception of Chaney 2013 who examines political party manifestos in the United Kingdom over time.

²⁶ One of the main uses of the CMP is to place parties on a left-right scale based on economic policy stances.

²⁷ We thank the CMP project for sharing historical political party manifestos with us.

Kingdom, Germany, and Sweden.²⁸ We combine automated and human coding. While Grimmer and Stewart outline the potential pitfalls of automated coding,²⁹ we recognize its usefulness for thinking about important descriptive measures that allow us to gauge the importance of foreign aid policy within political parties over time. For party positions on foreign aid, we require humans to carefully code the text because we want to capture the sentiment behind the position, whether it is positive or negative; whether policy positions are conditional on certain factors. Only human coding allows us to get at greater nuance regarding preferences and ultimately, a better understanding of the foreign aid decision-making process.

In a first step, we parsed party manifestos into domestic and international, foreign policy-related passages. To isolate these international passages we mechanized the process, rather than using human coders to identify passages of each manifesto. At the end of the process we were able to extract every sentence that involved international policy or outcomes.

Once we obtained the full set of international passages within parties across time and donor countries we used human coding techniques to isolate foreign aid related passages and capture their content across all measures of interest.³⁰ In a first step, we manually went through the text versions of the manifestos to make sure that they were divided into sentences or paragraphs. We then compiled a coding dictionary, which contained a series of words reflecting internationalism.³¹ Using regular expression techniques in Stata 14, we examined the number of times each passage contained one of the international words. Each word became its own variable so if a passage contained both the word international and global, each was counted once.

²⁸ This project is ongoing and we will add more countries and manifestos to the data over time.

²⁹ Grimmer and Stewart 2013.

³⁰ Our parsing methodology allows us to identify each foreign policy area with an identifying code (including but not limited to foreign aid) that other researchers could use to identify relevant passages for their research.

³¹ See Appendix 1 for a list of the words.

At this stage, the data were still at the paragraph level and contained the entire manifesto. To limit the passages to those involving international policy, we kept only those passages in which one of the selected international words occurred.³² Across time and our four donor countries the proportion of manifestos devoted to international policy ranges between 6 and 13 percent. We then manually worked through the passages with international mentions and selected only those that referred to foreign aid or assistance. Since paragraphs or passages can vary in length and might contain multiple mentions of aid, we converted each passage into individual sentences.³³ This gave us a total of 1759 sentences from the US, UK, Germany, and Sweden. With this information we were able to examine the extent to which parties differ on the amount of text devoted to foreign aid issues. As mentioned above and shown in Figure 1, parties devote between 1 and 3 percent of the words in their manifestos to aid. As a percentage of the international sections, this amount jumps to between 25 and 43 percent between 1960 and 2013.³⁴

To identify policy positions on foreign aid we created a second coding scheme that differentiated the aid passage into six relevant dimensions.³⁵ The first dimension is simply the passage's sentiment about foreign aid, distinguishing between pro, anti, and neutral positions toward foreign aid.³⁶ Figure 3 illustrates the extent to which parties were positive/negative about aid in their manifestos. There is a clear Cold War split in positive aid mentions. After 1990 the number of positive mentions of aid drops off dramatically for each type of party, but then

³² Some of the words in the international list could also apply to domestic policies. For example, a lot of international aid is targeted to help women and children in recipient countries, but women and children may be in need of aid domestically as well.

³³ The layout and translations of manifestos made this process less than perfect. Sometimes the conversion from pdf to text led paragraphs to be combined, especially if the text in the pdf was in columns. Translations would sometimes have incomplete sentences. We fixed the issues as best we could manually.

³⁴ See Figure A1 in the Appendix for a count of aid mentions out of international passages across time and our four donor countries.

³⁵ See Appendix 2 for the codebook.

³⁶ A neutral position is one that says something descriptive like "Britain and aid."

quickly rises again. Left parties very rarely say anything negative about aid. Conservative and center parties do have negative mentions, but the number is never very large.

[See Figure 3]

The second dimension codes positions on the utility of foreign aid and corresponds to hypothesis set 3. What is the purpose of foreign aid in the eyes of political parties? Should it be aimed at economic growth in the recipient country, be used for non-developmental purposes, or for humanitarian/disaster assistance? Figure 4 shows the number of “growth-related” mentions in Panel 1 and the number of non-development mentions in Panel 2 by ideology. There is a lot of variation in both panels. During the early years of the sample, Left parties referred to growth more often. Beginning in the mid-1980s, parties of the Right began to refer to growth more often. In recent years, all three types of parties have started to refer more to non-development goals.

[See Figure 4]

In a third dimension we code whether aid is targeted specifically at individuals. Here, we code the category as 1 if the passage mentioned specific groups of individual such as women, children, the sick or the poor that needed assistance. We also code party positions on how the aid should be delivered: the fourth dimension codes the extent to which parties mention multilateral aid or non-state development actors as actors involved in the delivery of foreign aid. Aid might

also be given directly to a recipient government. Each of the categories is coded a 1 if the passage favorably mentions the delivery channel and as -1 if the mention is negative.

Finally, we include a specific category for passages that mention aid effectiveness as either a goal or if it should be a goal. Individual mentions, non-state aid, and effectiveness categories all fall under our third set of hypotheses. Figure 5 shows that conservative and center parties are more likely to include mentions of individuals in their manifestos and are also more likely to discuss the effectiveness of aid. Not all passages will be coded for all dimensions. Some passages will be coded on only a single dimension.³⁷

[See Figure 5]

Wordfish

We also made a preliminary effort to use the Wordfish R package designed by Slapin and Proksch.³⁸ The idea behind Wordfish is to estimate party positions based on word counts. As with our handcoded data, the data used for Wordfish has to be preprocessed first. We started from the sentences we collected on international aid from each manifesto. To determine whether there are differences between party types, we saved documents for each ideology type and 5-year period. We then used Will Lowe's Jfreq program to get a frequency count of each word by ideology-period. In order to focus on the international words we dropped all words that did not match our list of international words. We then summed the data by the stem of the word, so

³⁷ We also coded for other dimensions which are not included in this paper. These include a dimension that deals with the outcomes of foreign aid but more along the lines of whether changes need to be made in the recipient or donor countries in order to improve aid usage. The first category is equal to 1 if the passage indicates that reforms are necessary in the recipient country to make aid more effective. A second category focuses on multiple donors and includes mentions that reform of multilateral institutions is necessary or that increased cooperation among donors would help aid effectiveness. Our final dimension codes whether any conditions are put on the aid and whether a specific allocation for aid is mentioned

³⁸ Slapin and Proksch 2008.

international and internationalist would both be considered international, and dropped any word that was mentioned fewer than 5 times across documents. This data contained 32 documents and 98 words which we ran Wordfish on. The results are presented in Figure 6.

[see Figure 6]

Initial findings

As a first cut, we aggregated our coding of each variable to the party-election year level to see if any big patterns emerge. For each category of coding, we summed the number of mentions by coder, creating new variables for the categories that could have a negative value.³⁹ Once the data were at the party-election year level, we averaged the scores of the two coders for each category.

In Figure 7 Panels 1 through 4, we are looking into how political parties position themselves within our four donor countries over time. In the case of the United States we see some prima facie differences in positive and negative sentiment expressed towards foreign aid: Democrats are more likely to mention aid favorably and Republicans are one of the only parties to mention aid negatively. These party differences do not appear to exist for the U.K., Germany, and Sweden.

[See Figure 7]

The differences between Left and Right parties comes across more clearly when examining whether parties focus on the effectiveness of aid. In Figure 8 we see that Democrats have not

³⁹ There are a lot of categories and we need to revise the coding and ensure greater correspondence across coders (see *future directions* below) so we focus on only 4 categories here.

mentioned aid effectiveness since 1968 while it has been mentioned at least once in 9 of the 11 Republican manifestos since then. Similarly, with the exception of the 2001 and 2005 electoral years, the Conservative party in the UK is most likely to mention effectiveness.

[insert Figure 8 here]

Preliminary Analysis

We estimated some preliminary quantitative models on the coded data. In Table 1, the dependent variable is the percentage of the manifesto devoted to aid. The first column aggregates all countries while the last four examine each country individually. We include dummy variables for Center/Liberal parties and for conservative parties so the base group is Left parties. We also include dummy variables for each 5-year period to control for any general trends in aid mentions.

[See Table 1]

While the percentage of aid is restricted to the 0 to 100 range, in practice it varies from 0.5% to 6.25%. We therefore use OLS for the models. Center and Right governments both mention aid less often than leftist parties but neither coefficient is significant. There are some interesting variations by country, though. In Germany, both the liberal party (FDP) and the Right party (CDU/CSU) are *more* likely than the SPD to talk about aid. In the UK, the Liberal Democrats devote more manifesto space to aid than Labour and the Conservatives. Finally, in the US Republicans devote significantly less space to aid than do Democrats.

In Table 2 we use Poisson models to estimate the number of times different aid categories were mentioned. We present only the combined totals, and do not run the models separately for

each country. Instead, we include country dummy variables to control for any country trends. Here the excluded category is Germany. As before we include dummy variables for both Center and for Right parties.

[See Table 2]

Parties in Sweden and the UK consistently mention each of these categories significantly less often than parties in Germany. Parties in the US mention Growth significantly more often than parties in Germany or in the other countries. There are some differences across party ideology as well. Not surprisingly, Right governments are significantly more likely to mention aid effectiveness and significantly less likely to positively mention multilateral aid. Surprisingly, Center/Liberal parties are significantly more likely to mention non-development and aid effectiveness than Left parties.

Our coding of the UK and US manifestos are more complete than the Swedish and German manifestos. In Appendix Table 3, we restrict the analysis to only parties from these two countries. The results are more in line with our expectations. Center and Right parties are both significantly less likely to make pro-aid mentions. Right parties are significantly less likely to mention growth or multilateral aid than the Left and are significantly more likely to mention effectiveness. As we continue with our coding, we hope that the results from the other countries fall more in line with our expectations.

Conclusion and Future Directions

In this paper we explored the impact of partisanship on a party's foreign aid position in its electoral manifesto. On the basis of newly collected data on party positions on foreign aid, we find evidence that the ideological identity of a party has a systematic effect on parties' foreign aid policy preferences on some but not all dimensions related to foreign aid policy and delivery, on average. Consistent with our expectations, we do find that conservative parties are more likely to mention aid effectiveness in their manifestos while Left parties are more likely to mention multilateral aid. There are also differences across countries. Parties in the UK and Sweden are less likely to mention any of the aid categories and parties in the US are more likely to mention Growth. Finally, the results are much more in line with our expectations if we restrict our countries to the US and the UK.

The results are preliminary. In a next step, we will revise the codebook and coding practice to increase intercoder reliability. To measure intercoder reliability, we ran Krippendorff's Alpha on the overlap of categories for the different coders. An alpha score above 0.7 is considered good for reliability. The results are presented in Table A4 for each category. There was no overlap in coding between Coders 2 and 3 so each comparison is between coder 1 and the other coder. There is not much agreement at all between coder 1 and coder 3. With the exception of nonstate, all of the alphas are below 0.7 and in several cases are below 0.2. The reliability of coder 1 and coder 2 is higher; although only two categories exceed 0.7, another 5 categories have alpha scores above 0.6. The results are then very tentative. Most of the categories need to be clarified to achieve broader agreement between coders. Nonetheless, we are encouraged by the fact that the results are in the correct direction.

Also, we are still adding more manifestos and countries to the data. As mentioned above, the manifestos for the UK and the US are complete. They had the fewest problems because they

did not have to be translated and because it was easier to cross-check with the full manifesto. The manifestos for Sweden and Germany are mostly done but for a few election years, party platforms still need to be coded. We have started with the manifestos of other OECD countries, which we will begin to code after we have revised the codebook. Besides our future plans for coding text, we plan to test our hypotheses using more fully specified regression models to strengthen the robustness of our findings.

We believe that our strategy of combining machine and hand-coding to measure more specific political party preferences for foreign aid can be easily applied for a range of foreign policy topics including international cooperation, security, and trade. In general, more fine-grained data on party preferences on international issues will allow scholars to combine insights from work on party behavior with those from international and comparative political economy to develop and test hypotheses about party behavior on issues of global dimensions.

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Figures and Tables

Figure 1: Aid Mentions over time (as percentage)




Figure 2: Aid mentions over time: By ideology




Figure 3: Sentiment about aid




Figure 4




Figure 5:




Figure 6: Wordfish results




Figure 7: Aid stances by country




Figure 8: Mentions of effectiveness by party




Table 1: % of Manifestos devoted to aid

	All b/se	US b/se	UK b/se	Germany b/se	Sweden b/se
Center	-0.119 (0.403)		0.296 (0.361)	1.648 (1.934)	-1.178 (1.561)
Right	-0.153 (0.440)	-0.610* (0.339)	-0.001 (0.361)	1.422 (1.618)	-0.430 (1.382)
1965-1969	-0.548 (0.959)	0.318 (0.758)	-2.280** (0.972)		
1970-1974	-1.357** (0.465)	-1.513* (0.758)	-1.336** (0.629)		
1975-1979	-0.469 (0.559)	0.167 (0.758)	-1.183* (0.671)		0.791 (1.702)
1980-1984	-0.395 (0.479)	-0.021 (0.619)	-1.165* (0.671)	1.679 (3.179)	3.110 (2.193)
1985-1989	-0.813 (0.485)	0.072 (0.758)	-1.642** (0.671)		0.646 (1.589)
1990-1994	-0.652 (0.560)	-1.581* (0.758)	-1.638** (0.671)	1.488 (2.248)	1.256 (1.643)
1995-1999	-1.602*** (0.385)	-1.352* (0.758)	-1.950*** (0.671)	0.379 (2.289)	
2000-2004	-1.206*** (0.318)	-0.832 (0.671)	-1.399* (0.671)	-0.027 (2.522)	0.358 (2.193)
2005-2009	-0.803 (0.529)	-0.529 (0.758)	-0.197 (0.671)	0.947 (2.631)	-1.097 (2.515)
2010-2013	-0.529 (0.478)	-0.356 (0.758)	-0.487 (0.671)	2.079 (2.289)	-0.609 (1.728)
_cons	3.107*** (0.521)	3.392*** (0.470)	2.844*** (0.517)	-0.218 (2.631)	2.722 (1.827)
N	89	27	32	13	17
r2	0.134	0.543	0.519	0.415	0.445
F	.	1.622	1.711	0.354	0.625

Table 2: Count of different aid categories

	Pro aid	Growth	Non-Devt	Indiv	Effective	Multilateral	Non-State
Center	-0.177 (0.140)	0.046 (0.185)	0.455** (0.215)	0.401 (0.298)	0.766* (0.423)	0.231 (0.309)	-0.026 (0.432)
Right	-0.079 (0.098)	-0.155 (0.131)	-0.024 (0.157)	-0.101 (0.237)	0.813** (0.332)	-0.674*** (0.252)	0.236 (0.305)
sweden	-1.190*** (0.184)	-2.465*** (0.473)	-1.885*** (0.311)	-1.450*** (0.371)	-2.384*** (0.688)	-1.830*** (0.524)	-1.691*** (0.579)
uk	-0.632*** (0.133)	-0.093 (0.182)	-1.233*** (0.211)	-1.087*** (0.289)	-0.909*** (0.351)	-0.695** (0.308)	-0.964** (0.394)
usa	0.013 (0.133)	0.601*** (0.193)	0.116 (0.196)	0.309 (0.284)	-0.304 (0.375)	0.137 (0.329)	-0.180 (0.390)
1965-1969	0.266 (0.302)	0.558* (0.324)	1.524*** (0.544)	0.782 (1.414)	-0.209 (0.746)	0.487 (0.579)	-0.756 (1.106)
1970-1974	-0.070 (0.280)	-0.411 (0.371)	0.972* (0.554)	1.410 (1.156)	-0.360 (0.668)	-0.005 (0.552)	-15.934 (1538.304)
1975-1979	0.273 (0.250)	-0.004 (0.325)	0.992* (0.530)	1.681 (1.099)	-1.503 (0.914)	0.319 (0.492)	-0.197 (0.722)
1980-1984	0.800*** (0.216)	0.843*** (0.252)	1.698*** (0.481)	2.640** (1.030)	-1.337* (0.811)	0.438 (0.453)	0.157 (0.617)
1985-1989	0.496** (0.248)	0.405 (0.303)	1.475*** (0.517)	2.706*** (1.047)	0.131 (0.587)	-0.619 (0.688)	0.742 (0.612)
1990-1994	0.321 (0.232)	0.392 (0.281)	1.465*** (0.489)	2.585** (1.035)	-0.609 (0.589)	0.015 (0.495)	-1.104 (0.814)
1995-1999	-0.035 (0.269)	0.125 (0.309)	0.816 (0.538)	1.823* (1.085)	-1.026 (0.715)	-1.106 (0.738)	-2.264 (1.498)
2000-2004	0.552** (0.232)	0.568** (0.272)	1.134** (0.510)	2.699*** (1.034)	0.485 (0.490)	0.596 (0.458)	0.686 (0.579)
2005-2009	0.506** (0.236)	0.426 (0.310)	1.403*** (0.506)	2.130* (1.089)	-0.294 (0.599)	0.013 (0.528)	-0.223 (0.707)
2010-2013	1.207*** (0.213)	1.004*** (0.276)	2.228*** (0.474)	3.467*** (1.029)	0.722 (0.484)	0.486 (0.471)	1.423*** (0.539)
_cons	1.704*** (0.230)	0.848*** (0.287)	-0.090 (0.494)	-1.845* (1.042)	-0.071 (0.590)	0.437 (0.491)	-0.110 (0.637)
N	89	87	89	87	89	89	89

Note: Poisson models on count of mentions in column category.

Appendix

Appendix 1: List of international words

accounta	fund	priva
Afric	glob	proces
agen	govern	progres
agenc	green	public
agric	harmon	recipien
aid	health	reform
assist	help	relie
benef	hiv	result
bilat	human	rich
budget	humanit	safe
capab	ideol	sanita
capac	imf	secur
care	impact	societ
child	internat	solida
civil	invest	spend
climat	legitim	standard
commit	measur	state
cooper	Millennium	strength
coordinat	mone	strong
corrup	monit	subsidia
countr	moral	subsidiz
debt	mortal	suppor
deliver	multil	sustain
democ	natio	tax
develo	ngo	technic
diseas	non-govern	terror
donor	non-state	trade
educ	organis	transfo
effec	organiz	transpar
effic	owner	treatm
emerg	parliam	united
energy	parliament	untied
evalu	participat	value
fair	people	water
financ	percent	wealth
food	politic	wom
foreig	poor	world
fragil	povert	

Appendix 2: Codebook for aid coding

Dimension 1: How favorable are parties towards foreign aid? (proaid)

Code as 1 if positive mention (foreign aid is good, needs to be increased, is necessary for reducing north/south divide), 0 if neutral mention (“Democrats and aid”), and -1 if negative mention (calls for aid cuts, aid has never done any good, aid is wasteful)

Example (“0”): We support the President's decision to suspend nonhumanitarian aid and impose targeted sanctions on the Zimbabwean regime and its supporters.

Example (“0”): The President and the Democratic Party believe that true development requires much more than delivering aid it requires building the capacity of governments and peoples so that assistance is no longer needed.

Dimension 2: Foreign Aid Utility (Why is foreign aid given? What are donors trying to maximize)

1 – Promoting aggregate outcomes - National/Economic Growth (growth)

Includes statements that say that party gives aid to promote development, growth, help reduce North South divide, help the poor, discusses economics; the statements should not include reference to non-developmental goals (see next category)

2 - Non-Development Goals (nondevt)

(a) Promoting Security/Peace/Diplomacy, (b) Promoting Human Rights, (c) Promoting Democracy, (d) Environment, (e) Other politics

Includes statements that say that aid is vital for national security, to improve trade relations between donor country and developing countries, to improve investment conditions.

3- Humanitarian assistance (human)

Includes statements that refer to aid in the context of disaster relief, without any mentions of development/growth goals, food aid, this also applies to health diseases (HIV Aids, tuberculosis)

Example (“1”): And as we did in the aftermath of Haiti’s catastrophic earthquake in January 2010, we will provide critical aid to countries facing devastating circumstances to meet their acute short-term needs and foster long-term recovery.

Dimension 3: How to maximize utility Part I - who are the targets of aid?

1- Individual-level aid outcomes: (indiv)

E.g. Women, children, poor; also includes –mentions of aid efforts that ensure delivery to individuals; - aid that targets the sick/needy; Millennium Development Goals;

Example (“1”): These efforts partner with African countries to improve nutrition for children, mitigate risks from volatile food prices, increase private capital investments, expand access to technologies and information required to boost food production, and provide greater assistance to countries that implement agricultural reforms.

Dimension 4: How to maximize utility Part II – which actors should be involved?

Bilateral aid (bilat)

Code as 1 if positive mention (bilateral aid is important, that it will be increased in the future, that it is effective at promoting growth and other aid goals) and **-1 if negative mention** (bilateral aid from donor to recipient government is politicized, that other types of aid are better than bilateral aid). Bilateral aid is aid that the donor sends to developing countries without involving other international actors.

Example (“1”): U.S. aid should be based on the model of the Millennium Challenge Corporation, for which foreign governments must, in effect, compete for the dollars by showing respect for the rule of law, free enterprise, and measurable results.

Example (“1”): And as we did in the aftermath of Haiti’s catastrophic earthquake in January 2010, we will provide critical aid to countries facing devastating circumstances to meet their acute short-term needs and foster long-term recovery.

Government delivery (gov)

Code as 1 if positive mention as aid delivery channel and **-1 if negative mention**.

Example: MCA aid goes through the government channel but only if the government has reformed itself.

Example (“1”): The President and the Democratic Party believe that true development requires much more than delivering aid it requires building the capacity of governments and peoples so that assistance is no longer needed.

Example (“1”): That is why the administration through its Feed the Future initiative has, with the G-8 and other countries, mobilized more than \$22 billion for a global food security effort aimed at building the capacity of nations to feed themselves.

Non-state delivery channels (nonstate)

Code as 1 if positive mention (NGOs, private actors, International organizations as delivering foreign aid, and do so in a positive way (e.g. individuals, charities, NGOs/private companies are delivering aid more efficiently than the state)) and **-1 if negative mention** (mention NGOs, private actors in development, and do so in a negative way (e.g. private companies do not belong in the foreign aid business))

Example (“1”): Faith-based organizations will always be critical allies in meeting the challenges that face our nation and our world from domestic and global poverty, to climate change and human trafficking.

Example (“1”): Together with the American people and the international community, we will continue to respond to humanitarian crises around the globe.

Multilateral Aid⁴⁰ (multilat)

Code as 1 if positive mention (statements that do support general (not specific) foreign aid contributions to EU, UN, WB, and other international organizations) and **-1 if negative mention** (statements that do *not* support general (not specific) foreign aid contributions to EU, UN, WB, and other international organizations; that foreign aid through the UN is wasted, that aid should only be used in a bilateral fashion (from donor to recipient country), that the international organizations are inefficient and need to be reformed)

Example (“1”): That is why the administration through its Feed the Future initiative has, with the G-8 and other countries, mobilized more than \$22 billion for a global food security effort aimed at building the capacity of nations to feed themselves.

Example (“1”): Together with the American people and the international community, we will continue to respond to humanitarian crises around the globe.

Recipient State/Public Sector (recip)

Code as 1 if positive mention(favourable mentions of recipient governments, importance of promoting good governance/strong institutions, working with government, includes subsidiarity principle in

⁴⁰ Please note differences between multilateral aid and bilateral aid given to international organizations for implementation (need to explain further).

development (help people help themselves) and **-1 if negative mention** (statements that talk about corruption/inefficiency in state institutions abroad)

Example (“1”): The President and the Democratic Party believe that true development requires much more than delivering aid it requires building the capacity of governments and peoples so that assistance is no longer needed.

Example (“1”): That is why the administration through its Feed the Future initiative has, with the G-8 and other countries, mobilized more than \$22 billion for a global food security effort aimed at building the capacity of nations to feed themselves.

Dimension 5: Outcome-orientation in foreign aid

1.1 Outcome-orientation in recipient country (out_recip)

Includes statements that refer to reforms that are necessary in the recipient countries to improve aid effectiveness including transparency, accountability, efficiency (e.g. mentioned 4 times in CDU CSU party manifesto), monitoring, evaluation, anti-corruption, etc.

1.2. Outcome-orientation among donors (out_coop)

Includes statements that refer aid agency reforms, reform of multilateral organizations (UN, World Bank), donor coordination, donor harmonization, etc as important measures to improve the effectiveness/efficiency of foreign aid

1.3. Outcome-orientation within donor (out_donor)

Includes statements that refer to aid agency reform to change conditions within the donor (e.g., streamlining agencies, decreasing ODA to reduce taxes)

1.4. Aid effectiveness

Coded as 1 if positive mention, and -1 if negative mention

Includes statements that refer to aid effectiveness being the goal; aid effectiveness needing to be pushed further/improved, or for a negative mention that aid effectiveness has not been goal

Dimension 6: Selectivity/Conditionality in Foreign Aid Policy

1. Aid Selectivity/Conditionality (select)

Includes statements that suggest that aid should only given when changes towards better conditions (e.g. good governance) are implemented.

U.S. aid should be based on the model of the Millennium Challenge Corporation, for which foreign governments must, in effect, compete for the dollars by showing respect for the rule of law, free enterprise, and measurable results.

Examples. if-then statements for selectivity:

If **Governance quality in recipient country is high/low** then Aid (high/low)

If **Governance quality in recipient country is high/low** (high/low) then Aid (more state aid/more non-state aid)

If **Governance quality in recipient country is high/low** (high/low) then Aid (yes or no budget support)

This may be applied to human rights and democracy as well.

1. Code 1 if specific aid allocation target is mentioned (target)

Aid should be 0.7 of GNI

Appendix table 3: Poisson results for US & UK only

	Pro aid	Growth	Non-Devt	Indiv	Effective	Multilateral	Non-State
Center	-0.379* (0.198)	-0.142 (0.226)	-0.506 (0.389)	-0.069 (0.479)	-0.235 (0.638)	-0.330 (0.436)	-0.771 (0.719)
Right	-0.316*** (0.111)	-0.293** (0.139)	-0.173 (0.173)	-0.177 (0.265)	0.750** (0.340)	-0.868*** (0.278)	0.084 (0.324)
usa	0.600*** (0.121)	0.669*** (0.152)	1.037*** (0.209)	1.183*** (0.314)	0.339 (0.327)	0.636** (0.289)	0.591* (0.354)
1965-1969	0.287 (0.302)	0.562* (0.324)	1.496*** (0.544)	0.770 (1.415)	-0.288 (0.746)	0.478 (0.580)	-0.773 (1.107)
1970-1974	-0.056 (0.287)	-0.398 (0.371)	0.983* (0.559)	0.413 (1.415)	-0.309 (0.667)	0.031 (0.552)	-16.996 (2715.018)
1975-1979	0.449* (0.261)	0.191 (0.324)	1.352** (0.536)	1.620 (1.155)	-1.042 (0.907)	0.625 (0.496)	-0.343 (0.851)
1980-1984	0.940*** (0.217)	0.841*** (0.255)	1.841*** (0.481)	2.773*** (1.031)	-1.179 (0.809)	0.588 (0.455)	0.368 (0.613)
1985-1989	0.360 (0.267)	0.402 (0.306)	1.394*** (0.533)	2.824*** (1.049)	0.162 (0.597)	-0.474 (0.684)	0.216 (0.714)
1990-1994	0.132 (0.284)	0.248 (0.319)	0.855 (0.586)	2.131* (1.096)	-0.349 (0.700)	-0.474 (0.684)	-0.631 (0.944)
1995-1999	-0.045 (0.300)	0.130 (0.329)	0.614 (0.618)	1.620 (1.155)	-0.755 (0.810)	-0.879 (0.797)	-1.730 (1.492)
2000-2004	0.623*** (0.239)	0.575** (0.279)	1.380*** (0.515)	2.958*** (1.034)	0.497 (0.510)	0.526 (0.490)	0.945* (0.574)
2005-2009	0.702*** (0.246)	0.694** (0.319)	1.583*** (0.519)	2.373** (1.125)	-0.061 (0.637)	0.132 (0.563)	0.062 (0.747)
2010-2013	0.914*** (0.236)	0.885*** (0.304)	2.000*** (0.496)	3.289*** (1.056)	0.257 (0.582)	-0.069 (0.598)	1.215** (0.574)
_cons	1.219*** (0.212)	0.847*** (0.250)	-0.942* (0.488)	-2.692*** (1.039)	-0.666 (0.513)	-0.000 (0.438)	-0.807 (0.571)
N	59	57	59	57	59	59	59

Table 4: Intercoder reliability: Krippendorf's Alpha

	Coder1-Coder2	Coder1-Coder 3
Not aid	0.759	0.408
proaid	0.627	0.265
growth	0.45	0.217
nondevt	0.467	0.178
human	0.665	0.129
indiv	0.646	0.394
govt	0.418	0.102
bilat	0.467	0.111
nonstate	0.72	0.732
multilat	0.63	0.354
recip	0.477	0.122
out_recip	0.464	0.177
out_coop	0.51	0.005
out_donor	0.275	0.168
effective	0.528	0.562
selective	0.382	0.088
target	0.632	0.73

Figure A1:

