

**In the Eyes of Donor Publics:
Evaluating the Branding of Foreign Assistance**

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Abstract: Recent research suggests that donors claim credit for foreign aid projects abroad to improve attitudes toward the donor country. The most obvious manifestation of this objective lies in the “branding” of aid projects, in which assistance is labeled, for example, as “From the British People.” It is believed to improve the donor’s image within the recipient country. At the same time – and perhaps even as its primary goal – the “branding” of foreign aid projects may serve the purpose of communicating to domestic audiences in donor countries what aid efforts accomplish. In times of increasing economic hardship across OECD donor countries, branding may help mobilize support for foreign aid (in general or for specific projects) by providing visual evidence of specific development contributions. Further, branding may strengthen support for incumbent foreign policies and incumbent governments. We test these theories on a sample of respondents in the United Kingdom using an information experiment in which some respondents are randomly assigned to learn about a development project through a branded video.

I. Introduction and Existing Literature

Bilateral and multilateral donors give foreign aid for many reasons, with poverty alleviation and economic development chief among them. The British Department for International Development (DFID), for example, aims to “increase access to the basics (clean water, sanitation, health care and education), prevent and tackle conflict and climate change and put in place the building blocks of wealth creation (property rights, effective public services, stability and the rule of law).”¹ When the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) was created in 1961, its mission was to promote long-term economic and social development.²

At the same time and throughout its history, foreign aid has also been intended to serve a geostrategic purpose. USAID makes no secret of the fact that its development assistance and humanitarian relief are intended to “advance U.S. foreign policy interests.”³ International relations scholar Hans J. Morgenthau wrote in 1962 that a policy of foreign aid was absolutely necessary since “the United States has interests abroad which cannot be secured by military means and for the support of which the traditional methods of diplomacy are only in part appropriate. If foreign aid is not available they will not be supported at all.”⁴ Empirical research on foreign aid allocation has repeatedly demonstrated that flows of foreign assistance do not necessarily follow patterns of recipient need but rather are responsive to security alliances, commercial ties, cultural ties and pressing geostrategic concerns.⁵ Donor states often use

¹ Department for International Development (DFID), *Bilateral Aid Review: Technical Report*.

² Committee on International Relations and Committee on Foreign Relations 2003.

³ USAID 2013.

⁴ Morgenthau 1962.

⁵ Morgenthau 1962; Schraeder, Hook, Taylor 1998; Alesina and Dollar 2000; Dunning 2004; Bermeo 2008; Dreher, Sturm, Vreeland 2009.

foreign aid to improve their “diplomatic clout” or to “compete for influence” against other countries. Foreign aid programs often are explicitly part of bilateral foreign relations, and development assistance has sometimes been justified as a tool to ease diplomatic tensions or win over potential allies.

Part of the equation in the strategic use of foreign aid involves donors working to ensure that aid recipients know where funding flows are coming from. One argument for such “donor credit-claiming” is that giving foreign aid should improve attitudes toward the donor within recipient nations. Beyond the funding for development projects and humanitarian relief, millions of dollars are spent annually simply to announce that donors are providing aid. This pattern of behavior may be particularly relevant in countries of geo-strategic importance where donors seek to strengthen or enhance their influence.

Underlying the notion of donor credit-claiming is the assumption that foreign development assistance is an effective tool for winning hearts and minds and that branding helps in these efforts. Since 2001, the development agencies in the United States have increasingly emphasized this aspect of foreign aid with the USAID branding office, Congress, and the State Department highlighting U.S. development assistance as “America’s good-news story.” As such, USAID staff are supposed to “make [their] efforts more visible and better known in the countries where [they] work.”⁶

⁶ USAID 2011.

Beyond its role in promoting foreign policy goals abroad,⁷ donor-credit claiming is also likely directed at domestic audiences. It serves to communicate to domestic audiences what aid efforts accomplish. As government budgets tighten across OECD donor countries, donor governments feel increasingly under pressure to demonstrate to their citizens that tax money is used wisely abroad. In the first instance, this means showing that foreign aid dollars are being used to fund meaningful projects. And in the second instance, this means demonstrating that elites and ordinary citizens in developing countries can see that the money is coming, for example, “from the British people.” As International Development Secretary Andrew Mitchell suggests in DFID’s 2012 Annual Report: “For too long, Britain has not received the credit it deserves for the amazing results we achieve in tackling global poverty. Some in the development community have been reluctant to ‘badge’ our aid with the Union Flag. [...] British aid is achieving results of which everyone in the United Kingdom can be proud. And I am determined that, from now on, Britain will not shy away from celebrating and taking credit for them.”⁸ International branding policy serves both to claim credit in developing countries and also to clearly demonstrate that credit is being claimed to the taxpayers who ultimately are footing the bill for these foreign projects.

The practice of credit-claiming is often implemented through visuals in the form of photos and/or videos. Examples abound in government communication materials across many donor countries. In 2013, DFID communications about a foreign aid project in Bangladesh presented a photo of a Smiling Sun health clinic in Bangladesh. The photo shows a small group

⁷ Recent evidence from an informational experiment by Dietrich, Mahmud and Winters (2016) show that the practice of credit-claiming by the United States has a small positive effect on ordinary Bangladeshi’s attitudes toward the United States.

⁸ Department For International Development. 2012.

of British and Bangladeshi officials alongside Bangladeshi citizens in front of a clinic, celebrating the opening of the clinic. Above the clinic's entrance, observers can find DFID's Union Jack logo, alongside the local Smiling Sun Clinic logo and the logo of USAID, which co-funds the clinic. This type of credit-claiming or "branding" is the most common way by which donors spread information about their role in funding public goods and social services in developing countries.

What are the effects of this form of credit-claiming on the attitudes of domestic audiences in donor countries? Does information about the way in which their government is credit-claiming influence how ordinary people perceive foreign aid, how supportive they are of foreign aid, or how they evaluate its effectiveness? It might be that branding helps satisfy people's desire to be acknowledged as having helped fund a project through tax contributions, which, in turn, might make them more supportive of foreign aid in general. It may also be that the branding of aid projects alleviates the donor public's concerns regarding corruption abroad as it may signal that the government is playing an active role in the foreign aid delivery process.

Alternatively, the branding of foreign aid may cause people to recognize the more instrumental uses of foreign aid and that, as tool of public diplomacy, the branded aid may be intended to make donors look good rather more than accomplish more substantive goals. The recognition of the instrumental character of branding may then decrease support for foreign aid. Some existing studies of attitudes toward aid suggest that this negative consequence of branding may be more likely among respondents with left-leaning political orientation who prefer aid to be development-oriented.⁹ Among more right-leaning respondents who support

⁹ As Fleck and Kilby (2006) show in their analysis of U.S. foreign aid, Republicans are more likely to support the use of aid for non-developmental foreign policy goals than Democrats. Tingley (2010) shows that partisanship over the utility of foreign aid extends to other OECD donor governments.

the use of aid for strategic purposes, branding may, therefore, even increase support for foreign aid. To date, little evidence exists to evaluate the effects of branding on public support for foreign aid overall or across different ideological groups.

Beyond its potential influence on public support for aid, credit-claiming may also influence other political opinions in donor countries. If understood as a tactic of public diplomacy, credit claiming may translate into greater citizen confidence in the government's handling of foreign policy and perhaps its competence in general. Such positive spillover effects could motivate governments to think of credit-claiming as a political tool to garner support for their foreign aid policy, their foreign policy more broadly, and indeed their overall status in the eyes of the public. Again, depending on existing views about the utility of foreign aid, the effects of branding may be differential across sub-groups of the population with different political orientations. We would expect more right-leaning – but not left-leaning – respondents to reward the current government for employing aid as foreign policy tool. This study offers a first cut at analyzing the domestic consequences of foreign aid credit-claiming in developing countries, a practice that has steadily increased over time in donor countries.

Using an original survey experiment on 777 British nationals from three experimental lab pools at the Universities of Essex, Edinburgh and Oxford, including 382 student and 382 non-student subjects, we shed light on four important questions: Does information about donor credit-claiming in a foreign aid project overseas improve peoples' attitudes toward foreign aid? Does it improve their perceptions about the effectiveness of foreign aid abroad? Does it influence their perceptions of government competence in foreign aid and foreign policy more broadly? And does the practice strengthen people's perception regarding the overall

competence of the U.K. government and their intended future voting behavior? Beyond average treatment effects, we explore whether credit-claiming varies across people with different ideological leanings. We investigate these questions with reference to a health intervention in Bangladesh that is funded with support from DFID.

We find little evidence that branding increases support for more aid spending in general. It does, however, increase support for more funding of the Smiling Sun Clinic project that was showcased in the survey treatments. This effect is not uniform across respondents of our sample. Instead, we find that the treatments decrease enthusiasm among left-leaning respondents for increasing funding while increasing enthusiasm for funding among right-leaning respondents. This result is in line with our expectation that respondents who are critical about using foreign aid for non-developmental, instrumental purpose will have a negative reaction to credit-claiming that communicates aid's instrumental use. On the other hand, respondents who prefer foreign aid to be used as instrument of statecraft have a positive reaction to branding, leading them to support the aid project. In addition, the results are mixed regarding to the effect of branding on the perceived effectiveness of foreign aid. Although the branding causes more people to think that the U.K. government is doing a good job of ensuring that aid is spent well, the branding per se does not change peoples' perceptions of the overall effectiveness of foreign aid in reducing poverty, and the information about the aid project in general seems to decrease perceptions of aid effectiveness. Finally, our results show that, among right-leaning respondents, branding has a substantial and significant effect on the likelihood of voting for the Conservative party if an election was held tomorrow. This suggests that credit-claiming may be an effective political tool for the Cameron government in rallying

the more aid-skeptical, right-leaning constituents around the Conservative party's political cause more generally.

Beyond its policy relevance, further investigation of the effects of branding on domestic politics is important for the development of scholarship that studies the interaction between international relations and domestic politics¹⁰ as well as literatures in political behavior and comparative politics. For scholars who study public attitudes towards foreign aid,¹¹ our tentative findings suggest that some information about development interventions might undermine support for aid. For scholars who study the effect of foreign policy on domestic political support, our initial findings suggest that credit-claiming may help garner support for incumbent governments.

Theory

If branding of foreign aid is widely criticized and unpopular among aid professionals in donor countries, one plausible explanation for its widespread adoption is that branding is not only or primarily intended to win over the hearts and minds of aid recipients (as is often assumed), but is instead primarily about winning over domestic publics within donor countries. Changing donor public opinion could increase support for foreign aid, and it could also change attitudes about the effectiveness of the government's foreign policy. If this is the case, then knowledge about branded aid, as well as knowledge about the ways in which branded aid is beneficial to the donor's strategic interests, should have measurable effects on donor country

¹⁰ E.g. Goldsmith, Horiuchi, and Inoguchi 2005; Goldsmith and Horiuchi 2012; Baum and Potter 2012.

¹¹ E.g. Milner 2006; Fleck and Kilby 2006; Tingley 2010; Hudson and vanHeerde Hudson 2012; Brancati 2014; Baker 2015; Heinrich, Kobayashi, Bryant 2016; Prather 2016;

public opinion. Yet it is also possible that highlighting the strategic use of aid and the ways in which foreign aid benefits the aid donor might undermine citizen perceptions about whether aid is actually being used to help people who need it most. Although our theoretical expectations are not country-specific, the hypotheses are tailored to branding by the United Kingdom and UKAID.

If branding is in fact a tool that helps increase support for aid within donor publics, knowledge that foreign aid is branded within recipient countries should improve attitudes about foreign aid. As a baseline, donor publics may increase their support for foreign aid if they simply learn more about a specific aid project (Treatment 1). But more to the point, we believe that donor publics may respond positively to seeing the UKAID logo at the same time that they are informed about the specific aid project (Treatment 2). They may be further persuaded to support foreign aid if they see that the UKAID brand is not only visible to them (the donor public), but if they learn that UKAID branding is also visible to aid recipients (Treatment 3). In this condition, members of the donor public are informed about an aid project, they are shown the UKAID brand at the same time that they learn about an aid project, and in addition, they see a photo in which aid recipients also see the UKAID brand with the “From the British People” tagline. In this way, the purpose of branding is communicated to individuals in the donor country, as they learn that the aid recipients know where the aid is coming from.

Finally, if members of the donor country public are also informed of or reminded about the ways in which donor branding of aid is helping to achieve the strategic objectives of their government’s foreign policy, they might be even more supportive of foreign aid (Treatment 4).

Such improvements in attitudes are most consequential when they result in support for increasing foreign aid levels. This leads us to Hypothesis 1.

H1: If respondents in the donor public are provided with more information about UKAID branding, they should be more likely to say that foreign aid should increase. Support for aid increases should be highest as the amount of information about and emphasis on branding increases ($T1 < T2 < T3 < T4$).

In the case of the UK, emphasis on branding and the strategic benefits of foreign aid are more closely associated with the Conservative Party, currently in government, than with other political parties. Therefore, in H1 (and also in H3 below), we expect that the effects of branding on support for aid will be greater among conservatives.

H1a: This effect will be greater for conservatives relative to all other respondents.

We are also interested in whether there is a tension between strategic and humanitarian support for aid, and hypothesize that information that emphasizes the strategic benefits of branded foreign aid will undermine perceptions that the aid is an effective tool to reduce poverty. This generates Hypothesis 2.

H2: If respondents are informed about the strategic uses of branded aid ($T4$), they should be less likely than all other respondents to think that aid is an effective tool to reduce poverty.

Finally, if branding is really a political tool within donor countries, we also suspect that informing donor country citizens about the strategic benefits of aid should improve attitudes about the foreign policy performance of the current government. This generates Hypothesis 3.

H3: If respondents receive more information about branding and the strategic benefits of aid, they should be more likely to approve of the foreign policy performance of the current government. Support for aid increases should be highest as the amount of information about branding increases across the treatment groups (T1<T2<T3<T4).

H3a: This effect will be greater for conservatives relative to all other respondents.

The four treatment groups and the control group are summarized below. As Table 1 makes clear, the treatments are additive. Keep in mind that in this study the aid project is the same throughout: we present information about public health clinics in Bangladesh that are funded with support from UKAID. We assume that this choice is not particularly consequential, but it is possible that the type of aid is also important, and that some of the dynamics we discuss may be more or less likely in the case of aid to Bangladesh, or more or less likely for certain types of aid.

Experimental Group	Treatment Components				
	Survey about British Foreign Aid	Aid Project Video with no branding	Aid Project Video with "UKAID From The British People" banner throughout	Photo of Clinic with UKAID logo in Bangladesh	Information about the Strategic Benefits of Branding
C1: <i>Pure Control</i>	X	X	X	X	X
Treatment 1: <i>Control Video</i>		X	X	X	X
Treatment 2: <i>Branded Video</i>			X	X	X
Treatment 3: <i>Highlighted Video</i>				X	X
Treatment 4: <i>Strategic Video</i>					X

Table 1. Summary of Experimental Conditions.

To evaluate whether varying information about branded foreign aid is consistent with our theoretical expectations, we focus on three categories of variables of interest: changes in levels of support for foreign aid, changes in perceptions of the development effectiveness of aid, and changes in the evaluations of the foreign policy performance of the government. The measures are described in detail in the research design section below.

Research Design

We embedded an informational experiment in a survey conducted on a sample of self-reported British nationals registered with experimental labs at the Universities of Essex, Edinburgh, and Oxford in March/April 2016.¹² We recruited a total of 777 subjects who completed the survey, which was evenly split between 382 student subjects and 382 non-student subjects, as well as 13 subjects who did not identify their status.¹³ Every respondent received a £3 Amazon voucher as compensation for completing the survey. The online survey instrument is included as an appendix to this paper.

We began the survey by asking some broad attitudinal questions, a question about the current economic situation in the United Kingdom, and a set of questions about media usage. At that point, we then indicated that the rest of the survey would be about foreign aid and asked three initial questions to gauge respondent awareness of foreign aid.

¹² Lab managers from the Universities of Essex, Edinburgh, and Oxford recruited online survey respondents through emails inviting them to participate in the survey.

¹³ A total of 1,107 respondents clicked on the survey link, of which 1,037 respondents began the survey. Fifty-two said that they were non-citizens and did not continue with the survey; another 20 answered no questions after the citizenship question. Because of a programming error, another 170 respondents faced early termination of the survey. Finally, 18 respondents reported that they were unable to watch the video that serves as our experimental stimulus, and we have removed them from the sample. This leaves us with a total sample of 777 respondents.

We then randomly assigned respondents to one of the five experimental conditions outlined above. The first condition was a *pure control* condition in which we did not show any treatment video and proceeded immediately to asking our main outcome questions. The four experimental conditions each included a short video about a UKAID-funded health clinic in Bangladesh. All respondents were told that they would be watching a video about a “British foreign aid project in Bangladesh” and that we would be asking them questions about their impressions of the project and similar projects after the video. All four videos featured the same content: a one-minute-long dramatization of the way in which the pre-natal services provided by a Smiling Sun Clinic calmed the anxieties of two expecting parents. In the *control video* version of the survey (T1), we included the Smiling Sun logo and name at the bottom of the video screen but did not include any UKAID branding at any point in the video.

The other three versions of the video featured UKAID branding: the UKAID logo and the tagline “From the British People”. The first *branded video* included only this in order to help us assess if adding the UKAID logo to the description of a development project influences respondents’ attitudes about foreign aid and their government (T2). This treatment was intended to be credit-claiming of the type that the average citizen might see when learning about foreign aid in the news.

In the second branded video, we provide the same tagline about British funding at the bottom of the video. However, prior to the video we provide additional information and photos that depict how in-country branding occurs, such that we call this the *highlighted video*. Specifically, we showed a photo so that our subjects could see the UKAID logo on top of the main entrance of a Smiling Sun Clinic in Bangladesh (T3). The text in the video read: “When the

British Government funds projects like the Smiling Sun Clinics, they often require that the project show the 'UKAID' logo." We aimed to be explicit about the practice of credit-claiming abroad: we wanted our respondents to think about how logos attempt to communicate to intended beneficiaries that the British government had funded a project.

The final version of the treatment video includes further information about the non-developmental, strategic value of credit-claiming. After the same opening as in the highlighted video, we add one additional sentence: "The goal is to enhance the visibility of UKAID's projects, to advance the UK's other foreign policy goals, and to improve the UK's image in Bangladesh." With this final *strategic video* treatment (T4), we explicitly establish the instrumental purpose of foreign aid to explore whether this additional knowledge intensifies or diminishes the effect of branding on our outcomes of interest.

Following the video – or immediately after the initial survey questions in the pure control condition – we ask respondents across all conditions to answer questions that capture our core outcome variables of interest. To explore the effects of the branding treatments on support for foreign aid we ask: "Thinking back to the U.K. Government's current budget of £760 billion: this year, the government is expected to spend 1.4 percent of the annual budget (which is 0.7) percent of the U.K.'s Gross National Income) on foreign aid to help people in poor countries. Knowing this, do you think the government should: spend more, the same amount, or less money to help people in poor countries?"

We then included two questions that would allow us to capture potential changes in perceptions of development effectiveness. Specifically, we asked respondents to indicate their level of agreement with seven statements about foreign aid that had been made in the past.

The two relevant statements for aid effectiveness evaluations were: “Foreign aid is an effective tool for reducing poverty in poorer countries,” and “Foreign aid is an important way of addressing global health problems.” We randomized the order in which respondents saw the statements.

The next question prompted respondents to express their opinion on a five-point scale about how the Conservative government “has handled the following issues”: overall foreign policy, relations with the EU, immigration, national security, international trade, foreign aid. Here we were interested in evaluating how branding would influence perceptions of government performance in foreign aid and foreign policy more broadly. Later in the survey, we also asked respondents to rate David Cameron’s performance as Prime Minister on a four-point scale and asked them about what their intended vote choice would be if a general election were to be held tomorrow.

For respondents who saw any version of the video, we included a set of specific questions that would allow us to evaluate the effect of varying branding techniques on levels of support for and perceived effectiveness of the Smiling Sun Clinics project featured in the video. We also asked open-ended questions where people could share their opinions about how they perceived that Bangladeshis were thinking about why the U.K. government had provided the funding.

Finally, we included two questions that served as manipulation checks: the first one asked the respondent to choose one of five video descriptions; with only one being correct (“The foreign aid project provides health services to expecting mothers”). The second one was

open-ended and asked people to state which logos they had remembered from the video. All survey results were recorded anonymously.

Results

The following preliminary results show average outcomes within treatment groups, sometimes broken down by subgroups of the sample. We then report regression coefficients on specific treatment-comparison indicators from linear regression models that include subject pool fixed effects and that calculate robust standard errors.

[See Table 2]

The first column of Table 2 reveals that, relative to a pure control group that did not see a video, respondents who watched the Smiling Sun Clinic video expressed *less* enthusiasm for spending more money on foreign aid. On a three-point scale, the difference is less than one-tenth of a percentage point and is not statistically significant. In the second and third columns, we break down the results for respondents from the right and left of the political spectrum.¹⁴ We find negative point estimates for both groups, but those for right-leaning respondents are at least three times as large as those for left-leaning ones.¹⁵ When all of the conservative respondents who saw a video are pooled together and compared against those self-identified conservatives in the pure control group, we observe a marginally statistically significant

¹⁴ We identified political orientation of left and right using a five-point ideology scale, where respondents could identify themselves as “very left” (1), “very right” (5), or in between (by one-tenth of a point units). The median self-placement in our sample is 2.5. We identify all people placing themselves at 3 or above as “right / center-right”, and everyone else as “left / center-left.”

¹⁵ Note that in all treatment conditions left-leaning respondents are more supportive of foreign aid than their right-leaning counterparts ($p < 0.01$ for all five treatment conditions). This accords with prior expectations.

difference of 0.17 points on the three-point scale, meaning that these respondents are less likely to say that the United Kingdom should spend more money on foreign aid.

Importantly, these results emerge from comparisons between respondents who did not see any video and ones that saw any of the Smiling Sun Clinic videos. They capture effects from learning about a U.K.-funded aid project in general but do not measure reactions to branding *per se*. If anything, UKAID branding in the video perhaps ameliorated these negative reactions. For conservatives, support for increasing foreign aid is at its lowest in the control video that uses the Smiling Sun logo (and does not feature the UKAID logo at all) rather than the UKAID logo, and for left-leaning respondents, levels of support for expanding aid are lower in this condition relative to two of the three UKAID branded versions of the video. None of these differences are statistically significant.

Our sample may be unusual for the fact that, on average, 60 percent of all respondents say that the United Kingdom should spend *more* on foreign aid. In the pure control condition, where people did not see the video at all, 75 percent of self-identified left-leaning respondents said that the United Kingdom should spend more on foreign aid, while 48 percent of self-identified right-leaning respondents do. These very positive attitudes about foreign aid are likely due both to the large proportion of students in the survey – 15 percent of the non-students say that the United Kingdom should spend less on aid while only 9 percent of students say that – and also to the framing of the question, which points out that aid is only 1.4 percent of the U.K. government budget and only 0.7 percent of U.K. gross national income.¹⁶

¹⁶ This finding is consistent with research by Scotto, Reifler, Hudson, and vanHeerde-Hudson (2016) which shows that revealing the relatively low percentage of foreign aid to ordinary citizens causes them to be more supportive of foreign aid.

That so many of our respondents support increasing aid may have something to do with the reason why information about an aid project appears to be reducing support for foreign aid. The concrete manifestation of a foreign aid intervention may not live up to some of the visions of foreign aid among our respondents. Unfortunately, we lack in-depth follow-up questions to diagnose how the video made people feel about foreign aid.

When it comes to specific support for the Smiling Sun Clinics, we see results more in line with our initial expectations about how people should react to branding, although only among right-leaning respondents. Since the pure control group did not hear about the Smiling Sun Clinics at all, we make comparisons in Table 3 among respondents who saw the four different versions of the video (T1-T4).

[See Table 3]

Among left-leaning respondents, there is less enthusiasm for increased funding for the Smiling Sun Clinics when they have seen a version of the video branded with the UKAID logo as compared to when they have seen the control version of the video. The difference is marginally statistically significant for the case of the video in which we highlight the use of branding in the field. For right-leaning respondents, in contrast, respondents are more supportive of increased support to the Smiling Sun Clinics when they have seen a branded video as compared to the control video, and for the video that highlights branding in the field, this positive difference is statistically significant. Whereas the left's support for expanding the Smiling Sun Clinics is greater than the right's support in three of the four treatment conditions ($p < 0.10$), the levels of support become indistinguishable ($p < 0.35$) in the highlighted video condition.

The first column of Table 4 provides some helpful evidence for how to interpret the decreased support for foreign aid that we observe in Table 2 across the conditions with videos relative to the pure control. As compared to the pure control condition, our respondents who watched one of our video treatments were less likely to agree with the statement that foreign aid is an effective tool for reducing poverty. On a five-point scale, the video treatments moved the average response two-tenths of a point toward disagreeing with that claim. It appears as if the videos do not encourage respondents to think about aid effectiveness. There are not significant differences across the four video treatments in this regard, so it is not a product of seeing the UKAID branding or hearing about the strategic motives for aid. The second column of Table 3 does suggest that respondents might view aid as more helpful for addressing global health problems after they have seen the video, but the differences are not significant and are positive only for two of the four videos relative to the pure control.

[See Table 4]

Even though the video is not making our respondents think that foreign aid is effective at reducing poverty, the third column of Table 4 reveals that some of the videos make people think that the United Kingdom is doing a good job of monitoring its aid. For the two videos where we show the branding in context – which involves respondents seeing a photo of U.K. officials visiting a Smiling Sun Clinic – our respondents are significantly more likely to say that the United Kingdom does a good job of ensuring that aid is spent well. The responses to this question in the control video condition and the basic branded video condition are not statistically distinguishable from the pure control. However, we see different response patterns for the highlighted video and the video that describes the strategic logic behind branding.

Therefore, while something about this particular video seems to have undermined perceptions of development effectiveness, by comparing across different versions of the video (where the treatments vary by the text and images that come before the video starts playing), we see that showing branded aid in context can improve perceptions that aid is being well monitored by the donor.

In Table 5, we examine the effects of the video treatments on people's perceptions of the strategic effectiveness of foreign aid. Again, we find that our video treatments *undermine* people's beliefs about what aid can accomplish. Across all four treatment conditions, respondents were less likely to agree with the statements that foreign aid strengthens political influence or that foreign aid helps the United Kingdom to make friends and allies around the world as compared to how people answered these questions in the pure control condition. In the latter case, the difference between the average response in the pure control condition and across the combined video conditions is statistically significant, although it is diminished to the point of not being statistically significant when we explicitly tell respondents about the strategic purposes of branding aid.

[See Table 5]

Again, we can only speculate here, but it might be the case that seeing the mundane social sector activities that are funded by aid makes people believe that aid is not influencing government decisions in the recipient country. It might also be that a project that is implemented by a non-governmental organization, we have decreased people's perception that aid is being used as a bribe with recipient governments. Or perhaps by showing a project located in Bangladesh, we have cued people to be thinking about a country that is either

already regarded as a strategic ally or else is not viewed as an important country to win as an ally or in which to have political influence.

Given that our respondents who have watched the videos about the Smiling Sun Clinics are not perceiving foreign aid either as effective for development or as effective for strategic purposes, the results in Table 6 – that the treatments do not significantly improve perceptions of how the Cameron government is conducting foreign policy – should come as no surprise. The one exception is that the strategic video treatment has a marginally significant effect on right-leaning respondents' views that the Cameron government is conducting foreign policy well.

[See Table 6]

In Table 7, we find – perhaps surprisingly given the above results – that the video treatments do generally, if not statistically significantly, increase people's approval of David Cameron as prime minister, and among right-leaning respondents, the videos about the Smiling Sun Clinic actually have a rather substantial – more than ten percentage points – and statistically significant effect on the likelihood of respondents saying that they would vote for the Conservative party if an election was held tomorrow.

[See Table 7]

Conclusion

Using an informational pilot experiment embedded in a survey run across subject pools of three universities in the United Kingdom, we ask questions about the influence of credit-claiming on public support for foreign aid, its effect on perceptions of the effectiveness of foreign aid, and its impact on domestic politics. While we look at average effects in our sample,

we pay particular attention to heterogeneous treatment effects by political orientation. As many studies have shown, individuals' views about foreign aid are akin to their views on domestic redistribution and map well onto the conventional left-right ideological spectrum: more right-leaning individuals are more supportive of using taxpayer funds to redistribute income towards the poor in developing countries.¹⁷ Also: more right-leaning individuals are more likely to promote the use of foreign aid to achieve foreign policy goals abroad,¹⁸ including the conduct of public diplomacy.

We find no evidence that branding increases support for more aid spending in general. It does, however, change support levels for the specific Smiling Sun Clinic project that was showcased in the survey treatments: among right-leaning respondents branding increases support for the clinics, while it does the opposite to left-leaning respondents. This result is consistent with our prediction that respondents who are critical about using foreign aid for instrumental purposes will have a negative reaction to credit-claiming that communicates aid's instrumental use. In contrast, respondents who prefer foreign aid to be used as instrument of statecraft have a positive reaction to branding, leading them to support the Smiling Sun Clinics.

The evidence is mixed regarding to the effect of branding on the perceived effectiveness of foreign aid: it causes more people to think that the U.K. government is doing a good job of ensuring that aid is spent well. It does not, however, have an effect on changing peoples' perceptions of overall effectiveness of aid for promoting development. Finally, our results show that, among right-leaning respondents, branding has a substantial and significant effect on the likelihood of voting for the Conservative party if an election was held tomorrow. This suggests

¹⁷ E.g. Noel and Therien 2000; Tingley 2010.

¹⁸ E.g. Fleck and Kilby 2006.

that credit-claiming may be an effective political tool for the Cameron government in rallying the more aid-skeptical, right-leaning constituents around the Conservative party's political cause more generally.

Perhaps the most surprising finding in this study is that relative to the respondents who did not see a video at all, the video had a negative influence on respondents' support for foreign aid. This finding may be, in part, explained by the fact that so many of our respondents indicated support for increasing aid –and it may be that a concrete manifestation of a foreign aid intervention, as captured in the video, may not live up to some of the visions of foreign aid among our respondents.

Our findings are the result of a pilot study and inform future research. In a next step we plan to increase our sample size to ensure that our experimental study is *sufficiently* powered to be confident in our ability to detect treatment effects across the range of treatments. Ideally, we would like our country sample to be nationally representative. Beyond our investigation of the effect of branding in the United Kingdom, we plan to conduct this experiment in the United States and (possibly) Sweden. Compared to the United Kingdom, the U.S. public discourse about foreign aid, including elites and ordinary U.S. citizens, has traditionally been more acceptant of using foreign aid for instrumental purposes. The actual practice of branding foreign aid has been accepted in the U.S. aid policy context for several decades. It is plausible therefore to expect to see some differences between U.S. and U.K. publics in the extent to which they respond to branding when it comes to measuring its effect on general support for foreign aid and a government's foreign policy as on views about its general competence. Compared to the United Kingdom and the United States, Sweden is considered a smaller donor

when measured in absolute levels of aid giving (though considered of the most generous if measured in aid effort). Compared to the United Kingdom and the United States, Sweden has more limited influence in global affairs, which, in turn, makes it less susceptible to pressures of “realpolitik” to use aid for strategic purposes.¹⁹ SIDA has traditionally embraced the primacy of development goals in its communications around foreign aid giving. Though we would expect the Swedish population and its different political parties to represent somewhat similar preferences vis-à-vis aid as we hypothesized in the case of the United Kingdom, we believe that a more comparative assessment of the efficacy of branding across our outcome measures might generate useful insights into how the practice of branding works in different country contexts.

¹⁹ E.g. Dietrich and Murdie 2016.

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Tables

	Should government spend less, spend the same, or spend more on foreign aid (1...3)?		
	All	Left / Center-Left	Center-Right / Right
Pure Control	2.53 (0.05) N=195	2.69 (0.06) N=112	2.32 (0.08) N=81
Control Video	2.39 (0.06) N=141	2.62 (0.08) N=78	2.10 (0.09) N=62
Branded Video	2.45 (0.06) N=146	2.67 (0.07) N=83	2.14 (0.10) N=59
Highlighted Branding Video	2.46 (0.06) N=151	2.60 (0.07) N=84	2.28 (0.10) N=64
Strategic Branding Video	2.51 (0.06) N=144	2.66 (0.06) N=99	2.17 (0.12) N=42
p-value from chi-squared test	0.82	0.57	0.59
<i>Regression-Based Comparisons</i>			
Any Video versus Pure Control	-0.09 (0.06) N=777	-0.05 (0.06) N=456	-0.17* (0.10) N=308
Any Branded Video versus Pure Control	-0.07 (0.06) N=636	-0.04 (0.07) N=378	-0.15 (0.10) N=246
Strategic Branding Video versus Pure Control	-0.02 (0.07) N=339	-0.03 (0.08) N=211	-0.17 (0.14) N=123

Table 2. Support for Foreign Aid Spending. Top panel presents means and standard errors for each of the five treatment conditions. Middle panel presents the p-value for a χ^2 test of H_0 : independence of treatment conditions from responses to question. Bottom panel presents regression coefficients from separate regressions with an indicator variable for the treatment conditions involved in the comparison. All regressions include subject pool fixed effects and use robust standard errors. *** - $p < 0.01$; ** - $p < 0.05$; * - $p < 0.10$.

	Should the United Kingdom increase its support of the SSCs (1...5)?		
	All	Left / Center-Left	Center-Right / Right
Control Video	3.50 (0.07) N=141	3.76 (0.08) N=78	3.16 (0.11) N=62
Branded Video	3.45 (0.07) N=145	3.61 (0.08) N=83	3.22 (0.12) N=59
Highlighted Branding Video	3.51 (0.06) N=149	3.56 (0.09) N=84	3.44 (0.09) N=64
Strategic Branding Video	3.54 (0.07) N=142	3.64 (0.08) N=99	3.29 (0.13) N=42
p-value from chi- squared test	0.80	0.62	0.76
<i>Regression-Based Comparisons</i>			
Any Branded Video versus Control Video	0.001 (0.08) N=577	-0.15 (0.09) N=344	0.16 (0.13) N=227
Highlighted Branding Video versus Control Video	0.02 (0.10) N=290	-0.19* (0.12) N=162	0.27* (0.15) N=126
Strategic Branding Video versus Control Video	0.04 (0.10) N=283	-0.11 (0.11) N=177	0.12 (0.17) N=104

Table 3. Support for Increasing Funding to Smiling Sun Clinics. Top panel presents means and standard errors for each of the four video treatment conditions. Middle panel presents the p-value for a χ^2 test of H_0 : independence of treatment conditions from responses to question. Bottom panel presents regression coefficients from separate regressions with an indicator variable for the treatment conditions involved in the comparison. All regressions include subject pool fixed effects and use robust standard errors. *** - $p < 0.01$; ** - $p < 0.05$; * - $p < 0.10$.

	Agreement that “foreign aid is an effective tool for reducing poverty” (1...5)	Agreement that “foreign aid is an important way of addressing global health problems” (1...5)	U.K. does a good job of ensuring that foreign aid is well spent (1...5)
Pure Control	3.84 (0.06) N=194	4.09 (0.06) N=194	2.90 (0.06) N=196
Control Video	3.64 (0.08) N=141	4.06 (0.07) N=141	2.98 (0.08) N=141
Branded Video	3.64 (0.08) N=146	4.14 (0.07) N=146	2.91 (0.08) N=146
Highlighted Branding Video	3.69 (0.07) N=150	4.07 (0.07) N=150	3.14 (0.07) N=151
Strategic Branding Video	3.61 (0.08) N=142	4.22 (0.07) N=142	3.18 (0.07) N=144
p-value from chi-squared test	0.42	0.66	0.20
<i>Regression-Based Comparisons</i>			
Any Video versus Pure Control	-0.19** (0.07) N=773	0.03 (0.07) N=773	0.16** (0.07) N=778
Any Branded Video versus Pure Control	-0.18** (0.08) N=632	0.05 (0.07) N=632	0.18** (0.08) N=637
Strategic Branding Video versus Pure Control	-0.22** (0.11) N=336	0.12 (0.09) N=336	0.29*** (0.10) N=340

Table 4. Perceptions of Aid Effectiveness. Top panel presents means and standard errors for each of the five treatment conditions. Middle panel presents the p-value for a χ^2 test of H_0 : independence of treatment conditions from responses to question. Bottom panel presents regression coefficients from separate regressions with an indicator variable for the treatment conditions involved in the comparison. All regressions include subject pool fixed effects and use robust standard errors. *** - $p < 0.01$; ** - $p < 0.05$; * - $p < 0.10$.

	Agreement that “foreign aid ... strengthens our political influence” (1...5)	Agreement that “foreign aid ... make[s] friends and allies around the world” (1...5)
Pure Control	3.70 (0.06) N=194	3.83 (0.06) N=194
Control Video	3.58 (0.07) N=141	3.66 (0.08) N=141
Branded Video	3.62 (0.07) N=146	3.63 (0.08) N=146
Highlighted Branding Video	3.62 (0.07) N=150	3.73 (0.07) N=150
Strategic Branding Video	3.64 (0.08) N=142	3.77 (0.07) N=142
p-value from chi-squared test	0.07	0.64
<i>Regression-Based Comparisons</i>		
Any Video versus Pure Control	-0.09 (0.07) N=773	-0.14** (0.07) N=773
Any Branded Video versus Pure Control	-0.08 (0.07) N=632	-0.12* (0.07) N=632
Strategic Branding Video versus Pure Control	-0.06 (0.10) N=336	-0.06 (0.09) N=336

Table 5. Perceptions of Aid’s Strategic Effectiveness. Top panel presents means and standard errors for each of the five treatment conditions. Middle panel presents the p-value for a χ^2 test of H_0 : independence of treatment conditions from responses to question. Bottom panel presents regression coefficients from separate regressions with an indicator variable for the treatment conditions involved in the comparison. All regressions include subject pool fixed effects and use robust standard errors. *** - $p < 0.01$; ** - $p < 0.05$; * - $p < 0.10$.

	On a scale from 1 to 5, ... how [has] the Conservative government ... handled ... Overall Foreign Policy?			On a scale from 1 to 5, ... how [has] the Conservative government ... handled ... Foreign Aid?		
	All	Left / Center-Left	Center-Right / Right	All	Left / Center-Left	Center-Right / Right
Pure Control	2.56 (0.06) N=194	2.32 (0.07) N=112	2.87 (0.09) N=81	2.62 (0.06) N=194	2.48 (0.08) N=112	2.81 (0.09) N=81
Control Video	2.54 (0.07) N=141	2.32 (0.08) N=78	2.82 (0.12) N=62	2.58 (0.07) N=141	2.47 (0.09) N=78	2.72 (0.11) N=62
Branded Video	2.46 (0.08) N=145	2.26 (0.09) N=83	2.76 (0.13) N=59	2.64 (0.07) N=145	2.51 (0.09) N=83	2.82 (0.11) N=59
Highlighted Branding Video	2.58 (0.07) N=149	2.35 (0.08) N=84	2.88 (0.10) N=64	2.65 (0.06) N=149	2.53 (0.09) N=84	2.81 (0.09) N=64
Strategic Branding Video	2.52 (0.07) N=142	2.26 (0.07) N=99	3.15 (0.13) N=42	2.60 (0.07) N=142	2.48 (0.07) N=99	2.92 (0.15) N=42
<i>Regression-Based Comparisons</i>						
Any Video versus Pure Control	-0.03 (0.07) N=771	-0.02 (0.08) N=456	0.02 (0.11) N=308	0.01 (0.07) N=771	0.02 (0.09) N=456	0.01 (0.11) N=308
Any Branded Video versus Pure Control	-0.03 (0.07) N=630	-0.03 (0.09) N=378	0.05 (0.12) N=246	0.02 (0.07) N=630	0.03 (0.09) N=378	0.04 (0.11) N=246
Strategic Branding Video versus Pure Control	-0.03 (0.09) N=336	-0.06 (0.10) N=211	0.30* (0.16) N=123	-0.005 (0.09) N=336	0.005 (0.10) N=211	0.14 (0.17) N=123

Table 6. Perceptions of Government's Foreign Policy Performance. Top panel presents means and standard errors for each of the five treatment conditions. Bottom panel presents regression coefficients from separate regressions with an indicator variable for the treatment conditions involved in the comparison. All regressions include subject pool fixed effects and use robust standard errors. *** - $p < 0.01$; ** - $p < 0.05$; * - $p < 0.10$.

	Generally speaking do you approve or disapprove of the way that David Cameron is handling his job as Prime Minister? (1...4)			If there were to be a general election tomorrow, for which party would you vote? (Probability of saying "Conservative")		
	All	Left / Center-Left	Center-Right / Right	All	Left / Center-Left	Center-Right / Right
Pure Control	1.95 (0.06) N=193	1.60 (0.07) N=112	2.43 (0.09) N=81	0.17 (0.03) N=193	0.07 (0.02) N=112	0.31 (0.05) N=81
Control Video	1.95 (0.07) N=140	1.65 (0.07) N=78	2.32 (0.11) N=62	0.19 (0.03) N=140	0.06 (0.03) N=78	0.34 (0.06) N=62
Branded Video	2.05 (0.08) N=142	1.76 (0.08) N=83	2.46 (0.13) N=59	0.23 (0.04) N=142	0.05 (0.02) N=83	0.47 (0.07) N=59
Highlighted Branding Video	2.03 (0.07) N=148	1.68 (0.08) N=84	2.50 (0.10) N=64	0.20 (0.03) N=148	0.05 (0.02) N=84	0.41 (0.06) N=64
Strategic Branding Video	1.96 (0.07) N=141	1.71 (0.07) N=99	2.57 (0.12) N=42	0.14 (0.03) N=141	0.03 (0.02) N=99	0.40 (0.08) N=42
p-value from chi-squared test	0.64	0.49	0.33	0.43	0.73	0.32
<i>Regression-Based Comparisons</i>						
Any Video versus Pure Control	0.06 (0.07) N=764	0.10 (0.08) N=456	0.03 (0.11) N=308	0.02 (0.03) N=764	-0.02 (0.03) N=456	0.11* (0.06) N=308
Any Branded Video versus Pure Control	0.07 (0.08) N=624	0.12 (0.08) N=378	0.08 (0.11) N=246	0.02 (0.03) N=624	-0.03 (0.03) N=378	0.14** (0.06) N=246
Strategic Branding Video versus Pure Control	0.02 (0.10) N=334	0.11 (0.10) N=211	0.16 (0.15) N=123	-0.02 (0.04) N=334	-0.04 (0.03) N=211	0.12 (0.09) N=123

Table 7. Perceptions of Government's Foreign Policy Performance. Top panel presents means and standard errors for each of the five treatment conditions. Bottom panel presents regression coefficients from separate regressions with an indicator variable for the treatment conditions involved in the comparison. All regressions include subject pool fixed effects and use robust standard errors. *** - $p < 0.01$; ** - $p < 0.05$; * - $p < 0.10$.

Appendix

Survey Instrument

This survey works best with Google Chrome, Internet Explorer, and Apple Safari.

Hello! My name is Dr. Simone Dietrich. I am a social scientist from the University of Essex. I study world affairs and public policy and would like you to participate in a survey. My collaborators on this survey are Dr. Susan Hyde (Yale University) and Dr. Matthew Winters (University of Illinois). Purpose of the Research: By participating you will contribute to scientific knowledge about public opinion.

Reward: Every participant will receive £3 in Amazon vouchers for completing the survey. The first 300 respondents will enter a drawing for five £30 Amazon vouchers.

Procedures: Participation in this study will involve answering a series of questions in an online survey. The survey is being conducted using Qualtrics. You must be at least 18 years old to participate in this survey.

Time Required: The survey should take 20 minutes to complete.

Risks and Benefits: No risks or discomforts are anticipated from taking part in this study.

Confidentiality: All of your responses will be anonymous. If you wish to be paid and entered in the drawing for the Amazon voucher at the conclusion of the survey, you will need to provide your e-mail address. This information will be stored separately from your answers to the survey questions and will be deleted permanently once the payment has been arranged and the drawing has occurred.

Voluntary Participation: Your participation is completely voluntary, and you may quit at any time.

Questions: If you have any questions about the survey, please contact Dr. Simone Dietrich at simone.dietrich@essex.ac.uk. If you have any questions about your rights as a participant in this study or any concerns or complaints, please contact the University of Essex Review Board, with policies detailed at <https://www.essex.ac.uk/reo/governance/human.aspx>

Q1. Would you like to continue this study? (By clicking "yes" below, you indicate that you have read and understood the information provided on this page.)

- Yes
- No

Q2. In what country do you hold primary citizenship?

- United Kingdom
- Other

Q3. We would like to ask you a few questions about how you see yourself. Can you tell me to what extent you agree or disagree with the following statements? I am generally aware of what is happening in other countries in the world.

- Strongly agree
- Tend to agree
- Neither agree nor disagree
- Tend to disagree
- Strongly disagree

Q4. I have enough trouble worrying about my own problems without worrying about other people's problems.

- Strongly agree
- Tend to agree
- Neither agree nor disagree
- Tend to disagree
- Strongly disagree

Q5. The dignity and welfare of people should be the most important concern in any society.

- Strongly agree
- Tend to agree
- Neither agree nor disagree
- Tend to disagree
- Strongly disagree

Q6. Some people think that the United Kingdom should not be involved in world affairs and concentrate on problems at home – they would be at point 1, while others think that the U.K. should be very involved in world affairs – they would be at point 5. Using the slider below, where would you place yourself?

Role of U.K. in the world

Q7. Thinking about the economy, over the past 12 months has the economic situation in the United Kingdom...

- Improved substantially
- Improved slightly
- Neither improved, nor worsened
- Worsened slightly
- Worsened substantially

Q8. Could you tell me how often you consult each of the following news sources?

	Every day	A few times a week	Once a week	Less than once a week	Never
1. Print / online local newspaper	•	•	•	•	•
2. Print / online national newspaper	•	•	•	•	•
3. News on local radio	•	•	•	•	•
4. Local news on television	•	•	•	•	•
5. National news on television	•	•	•	•	•
6. Other media	•	•	•	•	•

In the next section of the survey, we are going to ask you questions about foreign aid. Foreign aid is money that a donor government gives to poorer countries so they can build schools and roads, vaccinate children against disease, help individuals to open small businesses, and achieve other important development goals. Foreign aid is different from military aid, which the donor government uses to support the military in certain countries. This survey only asks questions about foreign aid, not military aid.

Q9. Generally speaking, how informed do you consider yourself to be about the United Kingdom's foreign aid program for poor countries? Some people consider themselves "not at all informed" – they would be at point 1 – while others think that they are "very well informed" about the United Kingdom's aid program – they would be at point 5. Using the slider below, where would you place yourself?

Informed about the United Kingdom's aid program

Q10. Have you heard of the Department for International Development which disburses British aid?

- Yes
- No

Q11. Of its total national budget of £760 billion, what percentage do you think the U.K. government allocates as foreign aid for poor countries?

Q12. In your view, what percentage of the U.K. national budget should the government direct to foreign aid?

T 1/T2/T3/T4: Now we are going to show you a short video about a British foreign aid project in Bangladesh. After the video, we will ask several questions about your impressions of the project and of similar aid projects. You can only answer the questions if you watch the video.

Q. Do you want to see the video again?

- Yes
- No

Q14. The United Kingdom delivers foreign aid in various ways to help people in developing countries. Which do you think is the most effective way for the United Kingdom? Please move the following statements to rank-order them, with "1" indicating most effective and "4" indicating least effective.

- Give money to British organizations and companies who work in poor countries.
- Give money to international organizations such as UNICEF and International Red Cross.
- Give money to local organizations and companies in poor countries.
- Give money to the governments of poor countries.

Q15. In your opinion, does the U.K. government do a good job of ensuring that our foreign aid is well spent by the countries that receive it?

- Very good
- Somewhat good
- Neither good nor bad
- Somewhat bad
- Very bad

Q16. Thinking back to the U.K. Government's current budget of £760 billion: this year, the government is expected to spend 1.4 percent of the annual budget (which is 0.7 percent of the U.K.'s Gross National Income) on foreign aid to help people in poor countries. Knowing this, do you think the government should: spend more, the same amount, or less money to help people in poor countries?

- Spend more
- Spend the same amount
- Spend less

Q17. In the previous question you answered. Can you please tell us what motivated you to give this response on foreign aid?

Q18. Here are statements that people have made in the past about foreign aid. For each statement, please indicate your level of agreement.

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> British foreign aid to developing countries strengthens our political influence in the world. 	•	•	•	•	•
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Foreign aid helps the United Kingdom to sell more goods and services to countries around the world. 	•	•	•	•	•
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> A lot of foreign aid from the United Kingdom ends up in the pockets of corrupt politicians in the developing world. 	•	•	•	•	•
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Wealthy countries like the United Kingdom have a moral duty to give foreign aid to poorer countries. 	•	•	•	•	•
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Foreign aid is an important way for the United Kingdom to make friends and allies around the world. 	•	•	•	•	•
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Foreign aid is an important way of addressing global health problems. 	•	•	•	•	•
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Foreign aid is an effective tool for reducing poverty in poorer countries. 	•	•	•	•	•

Q19. On a scale from 1 (very badly) to 5 (very well), can you indicate your opinion about how the Conservative government has handled the following issues?

- Overall Foreign Policy
- Relations with the EU
- Immigration
- National Security
- International Trade
- Foreign Aid

Q20. Thinking back about the video, do you think that the United Kingdom should increase its support of the Smiling Sun Clinics as part of its foreign development assistance program?

- Greatly increase
- Somewhat increase
- Neither increase nor decrease
- Somewhat decrease
- Greatly decrease

Q21. Do you think the United Kingdom should fund projects like the Smiling Sun Clinics in other countries besides Bangladesh?

- Yes
- No

Q22. Do you think that people in Bangladesh know that the Smiling Sun Clinics are funded by the United Kingdom?

- Yes
- No

Q23. Among those Bangladeshis who know that the United Kingdom funds the Smiling Sun Clinics, what do you think that they believe about the reasons why the United Kingdom provides the funding?

Q24. To the best of your knowledge, does the UK government do enough to publicize its foreign aid in the United Kingdom?

- Yes
- No

Q25. To the best of your knowledge, does the UK government do enough to publicize its foreign aid in the countries where it works?

- Yes
- No

Q26. In your view, what is the most urgent improvement that can be made to the United Kingdom's foreign aid? Please move the following statements to rank-order the three most urgent improvements, with "1" indicating highest level of priority and "3" indicating lowest level of priority.

- Enhance transparency
- Improve management of projects
- Improve selection of projects
- Communicate abroad that foreign aid comes from the U.K
- Improve monitoring and evaluation
- Strengthen public education about foreign aid

Q27. Now I will ask more general questions about your knowledge of past political events. Muammar Gaddafi, who was ousted from power in 2011, was the former leader of what country?

- Libya
- Iraq
- Israel
- Egypt

Q28. Please indicate if you think that the following statements are true or false. T/F if you are unsure please click your best guess. John Kerry is the current U.S. Secretary of State.

- True
- False

Q29. Enforcing international trade agreements is a responsibility of the United Nations Security Council.

- True
- False

Q30. The European Parliament is located in Strasbourg, France.

- True
- False

Q31. Any citizen of a European Union country can come to Britain to work.

- True
- False

Q32. Generally speaking, do you approve or disapprove of the way that David Cameron is handling his job as Prime Minister?

- Very much approve
- Somewhat approve
- Somewhat disapprove
- Very much disapprove

Q33. If there were to be a general election tomorrow, for which party would you vote?

- Conservative
- Labour
- Liberal Democrat
- UK Independence
- Green
- Democratic Unionist
- Scottish Nationalist
- Other Party

Q34. In politics people sometimes talk about left and right. In general, do you think of yourself as Left/Right?

Q35. Did you vote in the 2015 British elections?

- Yes
- No

Q36. Have you voted more than once in parliamentary elections?

- Yes
- No

Q37. Do you always vote for the same party in parliamentary elections?

- Yes
- No

Q38. Do you consider yourself politically active?

- Very active
- Fairly active
- Not very active
- Not at all active

Q39. Next you will see a number of countries and institutions. We'd like to know how much you trust each of the following countries or institutions to do what is best for the United Kingdom. Please use the slider to indicate your feelings, with 1 indicating "no trust at all" and 5 indicating "high levels of trust":

- United States
- The European Union
- The United Nations
- The UK Parliament
- The Police
- Your local county leadership

Now I will ask you some questions about your background and your opinion on certain political issues. Your answers are completely confidential. None of your answers will be associated with any personally identifying information.

Q40. In what year were you born?

Q41. Are you...?

- Male
- Female

Q42. What ethnic group or groups' best describe you?

- White
- Asian or Asian British
- Black or Black British
- Mixed
- Other

Q43. Are you...?

- Single, never married
- Single, living with partner
- Separated
- Widowed
- Married

Q44. What is the highest level of education that you have completed?

- Some secondary schooling or less
- Finished secondary schooling
- Completed A-levels or equivalent
- Bachelor's Degree
- Post-graduate/advanced degree (MA, Ph.D., MBA, etc.)

Q45. Are you currently...

- Working – as a paid employee
- Working – self employed
- Not working – looking for work
- Not working – retired, disabled, other
- Student

Q46. Please provide your best estimate of your pre-tax total household income in the previous year.

- Under GBP 7,000
- GBP 7,001 to GBP 12,000
- GBP 12,001 to GBP 20,000
- GBP 20,001 to GBP 40,000
- GBP 40,001 to GBP 60,000
- GBP 60,001 to GBP 100,000
- More than GBP 100,000

Q47. For each of the following statements about society and politics, please indicate whether your opinion in the appropriate fields.

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Citizens have a duty to vote in elections. 	•	•	•	•	•
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Government officials pay attention to what citizens like me think. 	•	•	•	•	•
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • There is widespread corruption among those who govern the United Kingdom. 	•	•	•	•	•

Q48. How often, if at all, do you attend religious services?

- Once a week or more
- Less often than once a week but at least once in two weeks
- Less often than once in two weeks but at least once a month
- Less often than once a month but at least twice a year
- Less often than twice a year but at least once a year
- Never

Q49. Could you tell me if you belong to, or regularly contribute to: (Please check all that apply)?

- Any political groups
- Any labor unions
- Any religious groups
- Any fraternal groups
- Any school service groups
- Any social service groups
- Any charities
- Any other organization not listed
- I do not belong to any organization

Q50. Are you working or have you ever worked for: (Please check all that apply)?

- Local government
- National government
- Charity
- Not-for profit organizations
- International organizations (e.g. United Nations)
- I do not have any work experience in any of the institutions/organizations above

Q51. In what country were you born?

Q52. In what country or countries were your parents born?

Earlier in the survey you listened to a video about a development project in Bangladesh.

Q53. Which of the following descriptions fits best with what you remember:

- The U.K. government was reluctant to fund the foreign aid project because of worries about corruption
- The foreign aid project provides health services to expecting mothers
- The U.K. government rescued a local citizen from torture by local authorities
- The government harassed opposition forces in the weeks leading up to the elections
- None of the scenarios above was presented to me

Q54. Thinking again about the video that we watched before, there were some logos – little symbols – on the screen during the video. Do you remember those logos / symbols, and can you tell me what they were?

Q55. Can you tell me who funded the development project depicted in the video?

Q56. Before submitting your responses, I want to give you the opportunity to comment on the survey. Please briefly remark on your experience with the survey (e.g. problems with the video, problems with understanding questions, etc.).